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IN THE SUP.REME COURT 
of the 
ST A'TE OF UTAH 
LARRY NICHOLSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, AMERICANA CORP-
ORATION and FIREMEN'S FUND 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 
9888 
STATEMEN·T OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a claim for compensation benefits under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act of Utah for injury sus-
tained by the plaintiff in an accident which he claims 
arose out of, or in the course of, his empl~oyment. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE INDUSTRIAL· 
COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission determined that the ac-
cident did not arise out of, or in the course of plaintiff's 
employment, and that therefore he was not entitled to 
compensation, and denied his application. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT 
Defendants seek an affirmance of the order of the 
Industrial Oommission. 
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8TATEiliEN·T OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in plaintiff's brief 
reflects the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Defendant employer and its insurance carrier, 
having prevailed in the Industrial Commission, are en-
titled to have the evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to them, and to have the order affirmed if 
there is any substantial evidence in the record to support 
it. We therefore deem it necessary to state here the 
evidence supporting the Commission's Findings and Con-
clusions. 
The record before this court is in two parts, each 
of which is separately numbered. We accordingly refer 
to pages in the record both by the part number and the 
page number. 
The record is replete with evidence .as to the occur-
rence of the accident which is at variance With the plain-
tiff's claim as to how the accident occurred. There is 
considerable evidence to support the Commission's find-
ings that the accident occurred as plaintiff was complet-
ing the process of washing and tidying up his car, 
something wholly unrelated to his employment. ~fore­
over, even if the accident occurred as testified by the 
plaintiff at the hearing, the Commiss:i:on would have 
been justified in determining that it did not arise out 
of, or in the course of his employment, and therefore he 
was not entitled to compensati'On benefits. We consider 
the evidence from these two points of view, under sep-
arate headings. 
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A. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
WHICH WOULD WARRANT TilE COMMIS-
SION IN REFUSING TO BELIEVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S TESTIMONY AS TO HOW THE 
ACCIDENT OCCURRED, AND IN FINDING 
THAT THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE 
PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE PROCESS OF 
CLEANING HIS CAR, AND WAS NOT IN 
ANY vVAY CONNECTED WITH HIS EM-
PLOYMENT. 
The original surgical report of Dr. Oliver Richards, 
contains the foll'Owing: 
1. Statement of Patient as to How Injury was 
Sustained: "While attempting to fasten hoo:k on elasti-
cized strap of terry cloth seat covers that had come un-
hooked, the hook slipped out of hand and flipped back 
and pierced right eye." (R. Part 1, p. 2). Apparently 
plaintiff made no mention to his attending physician 
of having removed a sales kit in connection with the 
occurrence of the accident. 
In employee's own application f'Or compensation 
benefits he stated: "Applicant was removing sales kit 
from rear seat of automobile. Elasticized strap on seat 
cover flipped and punctured his right e;ye." (R. Part 
1, p. 4). Although in that statement applicant claimed 
that he was in the process of removing his sales kit, 
he states that it was in the actual process of removing 
the kit that the pin was caused to flip, rather than that 
the plaintiff subsequently flipped the pin in attemping 
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to replace it after it was disloged while the sales kit 
was being removed. However, when he testified as to 
how the accident occurred at the hearing, plaintiff testi-
fied that in sliding the· :kit out of the car, he knocked loose 
one of the straps. He then set the kit on the ground 
and was in the process of attempting to refasten the 
strap when the accident occurred. (R. Part 1, p. 43). 
Plaintiff admitted that prior to the occurrence of 
the accident, he had taken his automobile over to the 
home of Dean Ellis to wash it. He had no particular 
reason to take it over there. He sponged it off and put 
it in order over there. (R. Part 2, pp. 76-77). Under 
his own testimony the,refore, the strap could have come 
loose as he was tidying the car up. 
Mter the first hearing of this matter before this 
court, Dr. Richards wrote a letter to the Industrial Com-
mission in which he stated that plaintiff "sustained a 
penetrating injury into his eye from some type of stretch 
hook that he was using to place seat covers in his car, 
which car he uses for his salesman activities, therefore 
lill!king this injury to his employment status." (R. Part 
2, p. 1). 
Dean Ellis also testified that plaintiff had straight-
ened his car up before the accident. (R. Part 2, pp. 17, 26). 
L~orna Linford, former mother-in-law of the plaintiff, 
testified that he had told her that he was washing his 
car and putting new seat covers on. As he was complet-
ing this operation, a pin slipped and hit him in the eye. 
(R. Part 2, pp. 35·, 36, 37 and 58). He also told her that 
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he "briefed" Dean Ellis before the first hearing. He 
further told her that he was going to take the insurance 
company for "all they were worth." (R. Part 2, pp. 
39-40). 
Leo Linford, former father-in-law of the plaintiff, 
testified that Dean Ellis said, in the presence of the 
plaintiff and various others, that plaintiff was putting 
seat covers on his car after having washed it and the 
last hook sprung and hit him in the eye. ( R. part 2, 
p. 63.) He further testified that the plaintiff himself, 
related the same story in his hospital room, on the 
night of the aceident. (R. Part 2, p. 73); .and that he 
also related the same story to the witness on a later 
occasion, after he was out of the hospital. (R. Part 2, 
p. 64). Plaintiff also told Mr. Linford that he had 
"worked out an angle" where he thought he could get 
the money. ''He figured that by stating that he was 
working at the time that he could come under the rule 
of the insurance company that he was employed at the 
time." (R. Part 2, pp. 64-65). He also mentioned "that 
he was going to have to work on ... Ellis, so that he'd 
have the same story .... " (R. part 2, p. 65). Plaintiff 
himself admitted that he had unhooked the straps of 
the seat covers and shook them out. (R. Part 2, p. 79.) 
The Commission, in its order, matkes it perfectly 
clear that it accepts the testimony of the Linfords, rather 
than the testimony of the plaintiff. " ... we choose to 
believe the testimony of Lorna Linford . . . and Leo 
George Linford." (R. part 2, p. 95). While ill feelings 
toward the plaintiff were frankly admitted by both of 
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these witnesses, this alone does not make their testimony 
unworthy of belief. They certainly had no greater motive 
to testify dishonestly than did plaintiff himself, who 
had a substantial financial stake in the outcome of the 
proceedings. The referee had the opportunity, as this 
court does not, of observing the appe.aran0e and demeanor 
of the witnesses on the stand-an advantaged position 
in determining their relative credibility. Also, as pointed 
out in the order, it seems more probable that an .accident 
of the type which befell plaintiff, would occur in the 
process of replacing seat covers, than in the process of 
removing the sales kit from the automobile. (R. Part 
2, p. 94). 
B. EVE.N IF THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED .A·S 
CLAIMED BY PL,AINTIFF, THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S FINDING 
THAT IT DID NOT OCCUR IN THE COURSE 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
Plaintiff's employment duties, as defined in his own 
testimony at the original hearing, were .as follows: His 
"work consisted of making appointments with prospec-
tive customers and then going out and giving them a 
pitch." (R. Part 1, p. 20). He was compensated on a 
commission basis for sales actually made. (R. Part 1, 
pp. 24, 52). He definitely was not paid for teaching 
other salesmen sales pitches or assisting in their train-
ing. In particular, he was not paid anything to teach 
Dean Ellis the sales pitch on the Harvard Classics. It 
was common in the organization for older salesmen to 
help younger ones as a matter of being a good neighbor, 
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or ingratiating themselves to their employer. (R. Part 
1, pp. 56-67' 60, 90-91). 
It is clear from plaintiff's own testimony at the 
original hearing, that his purpose in going to Ellis' home 
was not to teach him the sales pitch. He just happened 
to have a little free time and decided to utilize it by 
giving Ellis the pitch. His exact testimony was as fol-
lows: "Well, since we have a little time right now, ... 
Just a minute, I'll go get the kit, because I'll have to 
organize it before I can ma:ke a pitch, and I'll run 
through, take a half hour and show you the classics." 
(R. Part 1, p. 41). It was further established without 
dispute, that there were persons in the Americana organ-
ization, namely trainers and district managers, who did 
receive compensation in assisting in the training of sales-
men. (R. Part 1, pp. 56, 90, 116). However, plaintiff 
was not designated as such an employee. (R. Part 1, 
pp. 56, 90, 116). 
Similar evidence was also developed from the wit-
ness Dean Ellis at the last hearing. He testified that 
it was common for salesmen to help one another with 
pitches, but that they were not compensated for this, 
or for helping others. (R. Part 2, pp. 31-32). Salesmen 
were paid strictly on a commission basis. (R. part 2, 
p. 32). 
Beyond any dispute whatsover, plaintiff was not 
giving, or preparing to give, a sales pitch to a prospective 
customer. The most that could be claimed for his activity 
would be that he was preparing to put his materials in 
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order for use later in the day in the presentation of 
sales pitches. This would be no more "work related'~ 
than taking his automobile to a service station to be 
fueled; reviewing sales material at home before depart-
ing on a sales trip; or for that matter, getting up in the 
morning and dressing .and performing his toilet. All, 
in a sense, would be necessary steps to be taken before 
actually starting the performance of his duties. But they 
are not "work connected" in the ordinary sense of that 
term. They do not represent hazards of employment, 
but rather, hazards of every day living. If plaintiff's 
activity in this case can be said to "arise out of, or in 
the course of" his employment as that term is used in 
the Compensation Act, there would appear to be no 
limit as to the type of accidents for which an employer 
m.ay be held liable. Substantial evidence supports the 
Commission's finding that the accident did not arise 
"out of, or in the course of" plaintiff's employment as 
a commission salesman. 
ARGUMENT 
As we understand the position of the plaintiff in 
this case, he contends that there is no substantial evi-
dence in the record to support the findings of the Com-
mission; that the findings of the Commission .are there-
fore arbitrary and capricious, and that the findings 
should be set aside and the order of the Commission 
reversed. In other words, plaintiff contends that the 
evidence compels a finding in his favor. 
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The scope of review of an industrial proceeding by 
this court is set forth in Section 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953, 
which, insofar as material here, reads as follows : 
"The review shall not be extended further than to 
determine: 
"(1) Whether or not the commission acted without 
or in excess of its powers. 
"(2) If findings of fact are made, whether or not 
such findings of fact support the award under revieiW." 
We also invite the court's attention to the language 
of Section 35-1-85, U.C.A., 1953, which reads, in part, as 
follows: 
"The findings and conclusions of the com-
mission on que,stions of f~act shaU be conclusive 
and final and shall not be subject to review; such 
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and 
the findings and conclusions of the Commission." 
(Italics ours.) 
These two statutes circumscribe the scope and extent 
of review by this court of industrial proceedings. Almost 
from the inception of the Compensation Act, they have 
been before this court for review in innumerable cases, 
and this court has unwaveringly followed both the' letter 
and the spirit of the statutes. The rule of decision was 
well stated by this Court in the early case of Amalga-
mated Sugar Co. v. Ind. Comm., 56 Utah 90, 189 P. 69. 
It was there said : 
"The only question raised and presented to 
this court for consideration is whether or not 
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10 
there is. any substantial testimony in the record 
which tends to support the finding of the Com-
mission * * * 
"* * * It would subserve no good purpose 
to review the testimony in detail which tends to 
support the conflicting theories of the respective 
parties. In this class of cases, under our statutes, 
this court is confined to a review of the testimony 
and findings of the Commission for the sole 
purpose of determining whether or not there is 
any substantial evidence in the record to support 
the award .... If there is any subst,antial evidence 
in t'he record to support the filndings of the Com-
mission ,and the ultimate facts found by the: Com-
mission support the awar.d, we as a reviewing 
court, under our statutes, cannot do otherwise 
than enter judgment affirming the award made 
by the Commission." (Italics ours.) 
The above rule was restated and reaffirmed in a 
long line of cases following that decision. However, 
notwithstanding the ofrt reiterated exposition of the rule, 
cases attac:king the findings of the Commission continued 
to come before this court, and in the case of Adams v. 
Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 157, 246 P. 364, this court, appar-
ently somewhat annoyed at the need for restating the 
rule so frequently, admonished the bar as follows: 
"Counsel and litigants in these cases should 
understand once and for all that this court is 
powerless to review the evidence except for the 
purposes heretofore frequently declared by the 
court in a long series of well-considered cases. 
• • • 
"This court is now firmly committed to the 
doctrine that it will examine into the evidence 
only to ascertain whether there is any substantial 
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evidence in support of the findings of the com-
mission and whether it has either acted without 
or in excess of its jurisdiction. * * * " 
There followed another long line of decisions to the 
same effect, but it again became necessary for this 
court to lecture the bar of the state in the case· of Leventis 
v. Industrial Comm., 84 Utah 174, 35 P.2d 770 in the 
following terms : 
"In view of the record and the findings of 
the commission, our course is an open highway, 
marked by an unbroken line of decisions which 
have the support of both natural justice and of 
common sense. The principles involved are so 
limpid and axiomatic that their recitation or a 
citation thereof would be an adscititious burden. 
Therefore, we move straight toward a conclusion. 
In all respects the findings are supported by sub-
stantial competent evidence, which this court can 
neither weigh nor review, as the commissioners 
are the sole judges of the credibility of the wit-
nesses and of the we.ight of the evidence." (Em-
phasis our.) 
Even s·tronger language was used in the case of 
Park Utah Consol. Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm., 84 
Utah 481, 36 P.2d 979. It was there said: 
"It seems daft and unjuristic, certainly mal-
apropos, that this court should be required to 
repeatedly expostulate with legists about prin-
ciples so well established, and to so frequently 
reaffirm that the findings and conclusions of the 
commission on questions of fact (J)re conclusive, 
and final and are not subject to review .... and 
that they cannot be disturbed unless it appears 
as a matter of law that they ,(J)re contfiary to law 
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and contrary to the evidence. We cawnot weigh 
conflicting evidence, nor direct which of the two 
or more re,asonable inferences ought to be drawn 
firom evidence not in conflict. * * * In the deter-
mining of facts the conclusions of the commission 
are like the verdict of a jury, and will not be 
interfered with by this court when supported by 
some substantial evidence." (Emphasis ours.) 
This court has continued to follow the same rule of 
decision down to the present time. Apparently the most 
recent reaffirmation is in the case of Hackford v. Indus-
trial Comm., (Ut.), 380 P.2d 927. 
The problem presented to the court in this case 
can be well stated by quoting from the language of this 
court in the case of Peterson v. Industrial Comm., 102 
Utah 175, 129 P.2d 563, where it is said: 
"In the instant case we are not asked to 
determine if there is any evidence to support the 
finding of the commission. We are asked to de-
termine that the probative force of the evidence 
is such .as compels a finding contrary to that 
made by the commission. The commission having 
denied an award, found no liability on the insur-
ance carrier or employer, we are asked to declare 
that the evidence requires or compels a holding 
to the contrary; that the findings are so against 
the evidence as to find no support therein; that 
there is nothing in the evidence upon which a 
reasonable mind, a judicious mind could rest in 
arriving at a conclusion, and therefore the con-
clusion must have been arrived at arbitrarily or 
capriciously without regard to the evidence. * • • 
"* * * To be a reasonable conclusion it must 
be one for which from the evidence one can give 
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13 
re·asons which a judicious mind would deem 
worthy of consideration, upon which it would be 
content to rest a judgment. In the case of denial 
of compensation, the record must disclose that 
there is material, substantial, competent, uncon-
tradicted evidence sufficient to make a disre-
gard of it justify the conclusion as a matter of 
law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily 
and capriciously disregarded ther evidence, or un-
reasonably refused to believe such e·vidence. * * * 
"* * * If there is substantial, competent evi-
ernce to sustain it, then it cannot be said to be 
arbitrary or capricious. * * *" 
As shown by the authorities above sert forth, this 
court has historically been reluctant to interfere with 
the holdings of the Commission, and has reversed its 
orders, or set aside its findings of fact, only in the 
cleare'St of cases. One of the leading cases dealing with 
the question of what is necessary to warrant a reversal 
of the Commission on its findings of fact, was Kavalin-
akis v. Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 174, 246 P. 698. The rule 
there laid down is as follows: 
"By what has been said we do not wish to be 
understood as holding that there is no limit to 
the commission's power or authority in disregard-
ing or in refusing to give effect to uncontra-
dicted evidence. The commission may not, without 
any reason or cause, arbitrarily or capriciously 
refuse to believe and to act upon credible evidence 
which is unquestioned and undisputed. What we 
hold is that in case the commission is charged 
with having arbitrarily and capriciously refused 
to consider credible evidence, and we are asked 
to overturn the findings and conclusions of the 
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commission which appear to be in conflict with 
or contrary to the evidence, it must be clearly 
m.ade to appear to us that the commission acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously amd wholly without 
C(J!Use in reje•cting or in refusing to give effect 
to the evidence. We cannot set aside a finding 
or conclusion of fact merely because we are of 
the opinion that upon the face of the record the 
commission refused to give effect to certain un-
contradicted evidence. Before we cam set aside 
f,indings or conclusions of fact, the fact that the 
commission .acted arbitrarily or capriciously must 
be so cle:ar and convincing that but one conclu-
sion is permissible, and that we would be required 
to issue a writ of mandate directing a specific 
finding of dependency, as we are empowered to 
do by subdivision (d) of section 3148, supra. Any 
other conclusion would make this court merely a 
reviewing court with power to weigh the probative 
effect of the evidence." (Italics ours.) 
In the case of Norris v. Ind. Comm., 90 Utah 256, 
61 P.2d 413, this court further refined the principles of 
the Kavalinakis case, and set forth definite criteria by 
which to measure the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings of the commission. The standards 
there laid down were as follows : 
"Where the matter presented on appeal is 
the question of whether the commission should 
have in law arrived at a conclusion of fact dif-
ferent from that at which it did arrive from the 
evidence, a question of law is presented only when 
it is claimed that the commission could only arrive 
at the conclusion from the evidence, and that 
it found contrary to that inevitable conclusion. 
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But in order to reverse the comrn1sswn in this 
regard it must .appear at l.east that (a) the evi-
dence is uncontradicted, and (b) there is nothing 
in the recor,d which is intrinsically discrediting 
to the uncontradicted testimony and (c) that the 
111ncontradict.ed evidence is not wholly that of 
interested witnesses, or, if the uncontradicted evi-
dence is wholly or partly from others than inter-
ested witnesses, that the record shows no bias 
or prejudice on the part of such other witnesses, 
and (d) the uncontradicted evidence is such as 
to carry a measure of conviction to the reasonable 
mind and sustain the burden of proof, and (e) 
precludes any other explanation o1r hypothesis as 
being mo·re or .equally as reasonable, and (f) 
there is nothing in the record which would in-
dicate the presence of the witnesses gave the 
commission such an advantage over the court 
in aid to its conclusions that the conclusions 
should for that reason be disturbed." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The principles of the K avalinakis and N orri.s cases 
have been oft repeated .and steadfastly followed, as illus-
trated by the following cases: Kent v. Ind. Comm., 89 
Utah 381, 57 P.2d 724 ;O'Brien v. Ind Comm., 90 Utah 266, 
61 P.2d 418; West v. Ind. Comm, 90 Utah 262, 61 P.2d 
416; Milkovich v.l1'ud. Comm., 91 Utah 498, 64 P.2d 1920; 
Johnson v. Ind. Comm., 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308; Stod-
dard v. Ind. Comm., 103 Utah 351, 135 P.2d 174; Lorange 
v. Ind. Comm., 107 Uta;h 261, 153 P.2d 272; Bailey v. 
Ind. Comm., 110 Utah 395, 17 4 P.2d 429. 
Applying the tests of the Norris case to the facts 
of this case, we find that at least four of the conditions 
necessary for reversal are missing here: 
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1. The evidence is not uncontradicted. The plaintiff 
himself has not told an entirely consistent story, and 
there is evidence from others that he has told entirely 
different stories as to how the accident happened. 
2. There is much in the record which discredits the 
testimony of the plaintiff. 
3. The claim of the plaintiff is based wholly upon 
his own testimony, uncorroborated in any part, by that 
of any disinterested witness. 
4. The evidence presents at least an equal proba-
bility that the accident occurred in a manner different 
from that contended by the plaintiff in this hearing. 
It follows therefore, that plaintiff has failed to sus-
tain his burden of proof and further, that he has wholly 
failed to establish the matters necessary to warrant a 
reversal of the findings .of the Industrial Commission. 
Commencing at page 33 of his brief, plaintiff cites 
several cases from other jurisdictions wherein compen-
sation benetits were allowed for injuries or death of 
emloyees while engaged in work in and about their 
personal automobiles. However, an examination of those 
cases will reveal that in every instance an award was 
made in the first instance by the tribunal having original 
jurisdiction of the claim, and the reviewing court merely 
affirmed the action of the lower tribunal. In other 
words, the Industrial Commission, or an equivalent court 
or board, found as a matter of fact that the accident 
arose out of, or in the course of, the employment. Such 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
findings were uniformly upheld. Those decisions are 
all entirely consistent with the position advocated by 
defendants here, namely that the findings of faCJt of 
the commission are not subject to review, and, when 
supported by any substantial evidence, must be upheld. 
For example, in Hilyard v. Lohmamn-J ohms on Drilling 
Co., (Kan.), 211 P.2d 89, cited in plaintiff's brief at 
pages 34 and 35, the court said: 
"It is the function of the trial court to pass 
upon the facts in a workmen's compensation case, 
and where its findings are supported by sub-
stantial, competent evidence they will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. * * * 
"The ,scope of this court's appellate review 
is limited to 'questions of law', which in the final 
analysis simply means that its duty is to deter-
mine whether the trial court's factual findings 
are supported by any substantial, compentent 
evidence. * * * " 
And in Kingsley v. Donavan, 169 App. Div. 828, 155 
N.Y.S. 801, cited in the plaintiff's brief at page 34, the 
court in upholding the award by the State Compensation 
Commission, wherein it was determined that the appli-
cant was in the course of his employment, said: " . . . 
under Sees. 22 and 21 of the Workmen's Compensation 
law the decision of the commission is conclusive upon 
the facts." 
All of the other cases cited and relied upon by 
plaintiff are to the same effect. Further, in all of these 
cases, the evidence established that at the time of the 
accident, the employee was either on, or in the vicinity 
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of his employer's premises ; or that the accident occurred 
during regular working hours, or both. In addition, in 
most of those cases, there was evidence that the employee 
received some compensation or reimbursement for the 
expense of operating his autombile in his employer's 
business. In the instant suit the plaintiff was not on 
his employer's premises, and he had no regular working 
hours. The cost of operating and maintaining his auto-
mobile was borne entirely by himself. These decisions, 
therefore, do not in any wise support the claim of the 
plaintiff, but insofar as they are of any value at all as 
guides or precedents to this court, they support the 
position of defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
'The p1aintiff has the burden of proving that the 
accident arose out of, or in the course of his employment, 
hy a preponderance of the evidence. The only evidence 
offered to support plaintiff's claim is his own uncor-
roborated testimony. The Industrial Commission elected 
to believe the conflicting testimony of other witnesses. 
Even plaintiff's own testimony establishes that he was 
engaged in an activity outside the scope of his employ-
ment duties at the time the accident occurred. There-
fore, under an unbroken line of precedents established 
by this court, the order of the commission should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN AND JEN8EN 
By RAY R. CHRI8TENSE,N 
Att01rneys for defendants. 
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